Abstract. This paper studies a large population dynamic game involving nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems with agents of the following mixed types: (i) a major agent, and (ii) a population of N minor agents where N is very large. The major and minor (MM) agents are coupled via both: (i) their individual nonlinear stochastic dynamics, and (ii) their individual finite time horizon nonlinear cost functions. This problem is approached by the so-called ǫ-Nash Mean Field Game (ǫ-NMFG) theory. A distinct feature of the mixed agent MFG problem is that even asymptotically (as the population size N approaches infinity) the noise process of the major agent causes random fluctuation of the mean field behaviour of the minor agents. To deal with this, the overall asymptotic (N → ∞) mean field game problem is decomposed into: (i) two non-standard stochastic optimal control problems with random coefficient processes which yield forward adapted stochastic best response control processes determined from the solution of (backward in time) stochastic Hamilton-JacobiBellman (SHJB) equations, and (ii) two stochastic coefficient McKean-Vlasov (SMV) equations which characterize the state of the major agent and the measure determining the mean field behaviour of the minor agents. This yields to a Stochastic Mean Field Game (SMFG) system which is in contrast to the deterministic mean field game system of the standard MFG problems with only minor agents. Existence and uniqueness of the solution to the SMFG system (SHJB and SMV equations) is established by a fixed point argument in the Wasserstein space of random probability measures. In the case that minor agents are coupled to the major agent only through their cost functions, the ǫ N -Nash equilibrium property of the SMFG best responses is shown for a finite N population system where ǫ N = O(1/ √ N ).
1.
Introduction. An important class of games is that of dynamic games with a very large number of minor agents in which each agent interacts with the average (or so-called mean field) effect of other agents via couplings in their individual dynamics and individual cost functions. A minor agent is an agent which, asymptotically as the population size goes to infinity, has a negligible influence on the overall system while the overall population's effect on it is significant. Stochastic dynamic games with mean field couplings arise in fields such as wireless power control [17] , consensus dynamics [42] , flocking [40] , charging control of plug-in electric vehicles [33] , synchronization of coupled nonlinear oscillators [50] , crowd dynamics [8] and economics [49, 11] .
For large population stochastic dynamic games with mean field couplings and no major agent, the ǫ-Nash Mean Field Game (ǫ-NMFG) (or Nash Certainty Equivalence (NCE)) theory was originally developed as a decentralized methodology in a series of papers by Huang together with Caines and Malhamé, see [17, 19] for the ǫ-NMFG linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) framework, and [20, 18, 7] for a general formulation of nonlinear McKean-Vlasov type ǫ-NMFG problems. For this class of game problems a closely related approach has been independently developed by Lasry and Lions [26, 27, 28, 11] where the term Mean Field Games (MFG) was initially used. For models of many firm industry dynamics, Weintraub et. al. proposed the notion of oblivious equilibrium by use of mean field approximations [48] . The ǫ-NMFG framework for LQG systems is extended to systems of agents with ergodic (long time average) costs in [29] , while Kolokoltsov et. al. extend the ǫ-NMFG theory to general nonlinear Markov systems [23] . The extension of the ǫ-NMFG framework so as to model the collective system dynamics which include large population of leaders and followers, and an unknown (to the followers) reference trajectory for the leaders is studied in [41] . The reader is referred to the survey paper [4] for some of the research on MFG theory up to 2011.
The central idea of the ǫ-NMFG theory is to specify a certain equilibrium relationship between the individual strategies and the mass effect (i.e., the overall effect of the population on a given agent) as the population size goes to infinity [19] . Specifically, in the equilibrium: (i) the individual strategy of each agent is a best response to the infinite population mass effect in the sense of a so-called ǫ-Nash equilibrium, and (ii) the set of strategies collectively replicates the mass effect, this being a dynamical game theoretic fixed point property. The defining property of the ǫ-NMFG equilibrium with individual strategies {u o i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N } requires that for any given ǫ > 0, there exists N (ǫ) such that for any population size N (ǫ) ≤ N , when any agent j, 1 ≤ j ≤ N , distinct from i employs u o j , then agent i can benefit at most ǫ by unilaterally deviating from his strategy u o i , and this holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N . The estimates in [17, 20, 19] show ǫ = O(1/ √ N ) while distinct estimates are obtained in the framework of [23] .
A stochastic maximum principle for control problems of mean field type is studied in [1] where the state process is governed by a stochastic differential equation (SDE) in which the coefficients depend on the law of the SDE. The reader is referred to [5, 6] for the analysis of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs) of mean field type and their related partial differential equations.
Recently, Huang [16] introduced a large population LQG dynamic game model with mean field couplings which involves not only a large number of multi-class minor agents but also a major agent with a significant influence on minor agents (see [13, 12, 34] for static cooperative games of agents with different influences or so-called mixed agents). Since all minor agents respond to the same major agent, the mean field behaviour of minor agents in each class is directly impacted by the major agent and hence is a random process [16] . This is in contrast to the situation in the standard MFG models with only minor agents. A state-space augmentation approach for the approximation of the mean field behaviour of the minor agents is taken in order to Markovianize the problem and hence to obtain ǫ-NMFG equilibrium strategies [16] . An extension of the model in [16] to the systems of agents with Markov jump parameters in their dynamics and random parameters in their cost functions is studied in [47] in a discrete-time setting. See also [21] for the extension of the model in [16] to the case of systems with egoistic and altruistic agents.
The model of [16] with finite classes of minor agents is extended in [35] to the case of minor agents parameterized by an infinite set of dynamical parameters where the state augmentation trick cannot be applied to obtain a finite dimensional Markov model. Due to the LQ structure of the problem an appropriate representation for the mean field behaviour of the minor agents as a random process is assumed which depends linearly on the random initial state and Brownian motion of the major agent. Appropriate approximation of the model by LQG control problems with random parameters in the dynamics and costs yields non-Markovian forward adapted ǫ-NMFG strategies resulting from backward stochastic differential equations (BSDEs) obtained by a stochastic maximum principle [35] .
In this paper we extend the LQG model for major and minor (MM) agents [16] to the case of a nonlinear stochastic dynamic games formulation of controlled McKeanVlasov (MV) type [20] . Specifically, we consider a large population dynamic game involving nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems with agents of the following mixed types: (i) a major agent, and (ii) a population of N minor agents where N is very large. The MM agents are coupled via both: (i) their individual nonlinear stochastic dynamics, and (ii) their individual finite time horizon nonlinear cost functions.
Applications of the major and minor formulation may be found in charging control of plug-in electric vehicles [51, 33] , economic and social opinion models with an influential leader (e.g., [9] ), and power markets involving large consumers and large utilities together with many domestic consumers represented by smart meter agents and possibly large numbers of renewable energy based generators [22] .
A distinctive feature of the mixed agent MFG problem is that even asymptotically (as the population size N approaches infinity) the noise process of the major agent causes random fluctuation of the mean field behaviour of the minor agents [16, 35] .
The main contributions of the paper are as follows:
• The overall asymptotic (N → ∞) mean field game problem is decomposed into: (i) two non-standard Stochastic Optimal Control Problems (SOCPs) with random coefficient processes which yield forward adapted stochastic best response control processes determined from the solution of (backward in time) stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) equations, and (ii) two stochastic coefficient McKean-Vlasov (SMV) equations which characterize the state of the major agent and the measure determining the mean field behaviour of the minor agents. This yields to a Stochastic Mean Field Game (SMFG) system which is in contrast to the deterministic mean field game system of the standard MFG problems with only minor agents.
• Existence and uniqueness of the solution to the SMFG system (SHJB and SMV equations) is established by a fixed point argument in the Wasserstein space of random probability measures.
• In the case that minor agents are coupled to the major agent only through their cost functions, the ǫ N -Nash equilibrium property of the SMFG best responses is shown for a finite N population system where ǫ N = O(1/ √ N ).
• As a particular but important case, the results of Nguyen and Huang [35] for major and minor agent MFG LQG systems with homogeneous population are retrieved in Appendix G in [37] .
• Finally, the results of this paper are illustrated with a major and minor agent version of a game model of the synchronization of coupled nonlinear oscillators [50] (see Appendix H in [37] ). It is to be emphasized that the non-standard nature of the SOCPs in (i), which consists of the coupling through the SMV equations in (ii), arises from a distinct feature of the problem formulation. The source of this non-standard nature is the game structure whereby the minor agents are (through the Principle of Optimality) optimizing with respect to the future stochastic evolution of the major agent's state which is partly a result of that agent's future best response control actions. This feature vanishes in the non-game theoretic setting of one controller with one cost function with respect to the trajectories of all the system components (the classical SOCPs), moreover it also vanishes in the infinite population limit of the standard ǫ-NMFG models with no major agent. This is true for both completely and partially observed SOCPs. The nonstandard feature of the SOCPs here give rise to the analysis of systems with (non necessarily Markovian) stochastic parameters. Here, as in [35, 52] , the theory of BSDEs (see in particular [2, 43, 44, 45] ) is used in the resulting stochastic dynamic game theory. More specifically, we utilize techniques from [44] which applies the Principle of Optimality to a stochastic nonlinear control problem with random coefficients; this leads to a formulation of a SHJB equation by use of (i) a semi-martingale representation for the corresponding stochastic value function, and (ii) the Itô-Kunita formula. An application of Peng results to portfolio-consumption optimization under habit formation in complete markets is studied in [10] .
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to the problem formulation. A McKean-Vlasov approximation for major and minor agent system is studied in Section 3. Section 4 presents a preliminary nonlinear SOCP with random parameters. The SMFG system of equations of the MM agents is given in Section 5, and the existence and uniqueness of its solution is established in Section 6. The ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of the resulting SMFG control laws is studied in Section 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.
Notation and Terminology.
The following notation will be used throughout the paper. Let R n denote the n-dimensional real Euclidean space with the standard Euclidean norm | · | and the standard Euclidean inner product ·, · . The transpose of a vector (or matrix) x is denoted by x T . tr(A) denotes the trace of a square matrix A. Let R n×m be the Hilbert space consisting of all (n × m)-matrices with the inner product < A, B >:= tr(AB T ) and the norm |A| :=< A, A > 1/2 . The set of non-negative real numbers is denoted by R + . T ∈ [0, ∞) is reserved to denote the terminal time. The integer N is reserved to designate the population size of the minor agents. The superscript N for a process (such as state, control or cost function) is used to indicate the dependence on the population size N . We use the subscript 0 for the major agent A 0 and an integer valued subscript for an individual minor agent {A i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N }. At time t ≥ 0, (i) the states of agents A 0 and A i are respectively denoted by z N 0 (t) and z N i (t), 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and (ii) for the system configuration of minor agents (z N 1 (t), · · · , z N N (t)) the empirical distribution δ N t is defined as the normalized sum of Dirac's masses, i.e., δ
is the Dirac measure. C(S) is the set of continuous functions and C k (S) the set of k-times continuously differentiable functions on S. The symbol ∂ t denotes the partial derivative with respect to variables t. We denote D x and D 2 xx as the gradient and Hessian operators with respect to the variable x. These are respectively denoted by ∂ x and ∂ 2 xx when applied to a function defined on a one-dimensional domain. Let (Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P) be a complete filtered probability space. E denotes the expectation. The conditional expectation with respect to the σ-field V is denoted by E V . For an Euclidean space H we denote by
We use the notation (E ω h)(z) := h(z, ω)P ω (dω) for any function h(z, ω) and sample point ω ∈ Ω. Finally, note that we may not display the dependence of random variables or stochastic processes on the sample point ω ∈ Ω.
2. Problem Formulation. We consider a dynamic game involving: (i) a major agent A 0 , and (ii) a population of N minor agents {A i : 1 ≤ i ≤ N } where N is very large. We assume homogenous minor agents although the modelling may be generalized to the case of multi-class heterogeneous minor agents [20, 16] (see [38] ).
The dynamics of the agents are given by the following controlled Itô stochastic differential equations on (Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P):
n is the state of the major agent A 0 and z
n is the state of the minor agent
(iv) the set of initial states is given by {z N j (0) = z j (0) : 0 ≤ j ≤ N }, and (v) the sequence {(w j (t)) t≥0 : 0 ≤ j ≤ N } denotes N + 1 mutually independent standard Brownian motions in R m . We denote the filtration F t as the σ-field generated by the initial states and the Brownian motions up to time t, i.e., F t := σ{z j (0), w j (s) : 0 ≤ j ≤ N, 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. We also set F w0 t = σ{z 0 (0), w 0 (s) : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}. These filtrations are augmented by all the P-null sets in F .
For
The objective of each agent is to minimize its finite time horizon nonlinear cost function given by We note that in the modelling (2.1)-(2.4) the major agent A 0 has a significant influence on minor agents while each minor agent has an asymptotically negligible impact on other agents in a large N population system. The major and minor agents are coupled via both: (i) their individual nonlinear stochastic dynamics (2.1)-(2.2), and (ii) their individual finite time horizon nonlinear cost functions (2.3)-(2.4).
We note that the coupling terms may be written as functionals of the empirical distribution δ
φ(x i (t)) for a bounded continuous function φ in R n . Remark 2.1. Under suitable conditions, the results of this paper may be adapted to deal with cost-couplings of the form:
2.1. Assumptions. Let the empirical distribution of N minor agents' initial states be defined by F N (x) = (1/N ) N i=1 1 {Ezi(0)<x} , where 1 {Ezi(0)<x} = 1 if Ez i (0) < x, and 1 {Ezi(0)<x} = 0 otherwise. We enunciate the following assumptions:
(A1) The initial states {z j (0) : 0 ≤ j ≤ N } are F 0 -adapted random variables mutually independent and independent of all Brownian motions {(w j (t)) t≥0 : 0 ≤ j ≤ N }, and there exists a constant k independent of N such that sup 0≤j≤N
(A2) {F N : N ≥ 1} converges to a probability distribution F weakly, i.e., for any bounded and continuous function φ on R n we have lim (A7) (Non-degeneracy Assumption) There exists a positive constant α such that
where σ 0 and σ are given in (2.1) and (2.2).
3. McKean-Vlasov Approximation for Mean Field Game Analysis. Motivated by the analysis in Section I.1 of [46] and in Section 8.1 of [20] , we take a probabilistic approach to establish the following asymptotic properties: (i) The influence of any minor agent A i on any other minor agent A j is asymptotically negligible as the population size N goes to infinity, and (ii) In the limit, the effect of the mass of agents on a given minor agent A i is that of the behaviour of a mass of predictable generic agents. This is in the form of a single mean field function in the LQG case [17, 19] or a predictable state probability distribution in the nonlinear case [20, 18, 28] .
t -measurable stochastic processes for which we introduce the following assumption:
(H4) ϕ 0 (ω, t, x) and ϕ(ω, t, x) are Lipschitz continuous in x, and
We assume that ϕ 0 (t, x) := ϕ 0 (ω, t, x) and ϕ(t, x) := ϕ(ω, t, x) are respectively used by the major and minor agents as their control laws in (2.1) and (2.2) (i.e., u 0 = ϕ 0 and u i = ϕ for 1 ≤ i ≤ N ). Then we have the following closed-loop equations with random coefficients:
Under ( We now introduce the McKean-Vlasov (MV) system
with initial condition (z 0 (0),z(0)), where for an arbitrary function g ∈ C(R s ) for appropriate s, and probability distribution µ t in R n we set
when the indicated integral converges. In using the MV system it is assumed that the infinite population of minor agents can be modelled by the collection of sample paths of individual agents subject to their individual initial conditions and their individual Brownian sample paths. In the above MV system z 0 (·),z(·), µ (·) is a "consistent solution" if z 0 (·),z(·) is a solution to the above MV system, µ t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , is the conditional law ofz(t) given F w0 t (i.e., µ t := L z(t)|F w0 t ). Under (A4)-(A5) and (H4) it can be shown by a fixed point argument that there exists a unique solution z 0 (·),z(·), µ (·) to the above system (see Theorem 1.1 in [46] or Theorem 6.7 below).
We also introduce the equations
with initial conditionsz j (0) = z j (0), 0 ≤ j ≤ N , which can be viewed as N independent samples of the MV system above. We develop a decoupling result below such that eachẑ N i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N , has the natural limitz i in the infinite population limit (see Theorem 12 in [20] ).
The proof of the following theorem, which is based on the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, Gronwall's lemma and the conditional independence of minor agents given F w0 t , is given in Appendix A in [37] . 
where the right hand side may depend upon the terminal time T . We now consider the following single agent nonlinear stochastic optimal control problem (SOCP) on (Ω, F , {F t } t≥0 , P):
A Preliminary
where the coefficients f, σ, ς and L are random depending on ω ∈ Ω explicitly. In (4.1)-
n is the state of the agent with F
t -adapted stochastic processes; (iv) the admissible control set U is taken as U := u(·) ∈ U : u(t) is adapted to σ-field F W,B t and E T 0 |u(t)| 2 dt < ∞ . We introduce the following assumptions (see [44] ). 
In addition, they and all their first derivatives (w.r.t. x) are a.s. continuous and bounded.
(H3) (Non-degeneracy Assumption) There exist non-negative constants α 1 and α 2 such that
where α 1 or α 2 (but not both) can be zero. The value function for the SOCP (4.1)-(4.2) is defined by (see [44] )
where x(t) is the initial condition for the process z(·). We note that φ t, x(t) is an F W t -adapted process which is sample path continuous a.s. under the assumptions (H1)-(H2). We assume that there exists an optimal control law u o ∈ U such that
where x(·) is the closed-loop solution when the control law u o is applied. By the Principle of Optimality, it can be shown that the process
is an {F W t } 0≤t≤T -martingale (see [3] ). Next, by the martingale representation theorem (see Theorem 5.7, Chapter 1, [53] ) along the optimal solution x(·) there exists an F W t -adapted process ψ ·, x(·) such that
From (4.4)-(4.5) and the fact that φ(T, x(T )) = 0, it follows that
which gives
Hence, combining (4.4)-(4.6) yields
where φ s, x(s) , Γ s, x(s) and ψ s, x(s) are F W s -adapted stochastic processes (see the assumed semi-martingale representation form (3.5) in [44] ).
Using the extended Itô-Kunita formula (see Appendix B in [37] ) and the Principle of Optimality, Peng [44] showed that since φ(t, x) can be expressed in the semimartingale form (4.7), and if φ(t, x), ψ(t, x), D x φ(t, x), D 2 xx φ(t, x) and D x ψ(x, t) are a.s. continuous in (x, t), then the pair φ(s, x), ψ(s, x) satisfies the following backward in time stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) equation:
We note that the appearance of the term σ[t, ω, x], D x ψ(t, ω, x) in equation (4.8) corresponds to the Brownian motion W (·) in the extended Itô-Kunita formula (B.1) for the composition of F W t -adapted stochastic processes φ(t, ω, x) and z(t, ω) given in (4.7) and (4.1), respectively.
The solution to the backward in time SHJB equation (4.8) is a unique forward in time F W t -adapted pair (φ, ψ)(t, x) ≡ φ(t, ω, x), ψ(t, ω, x) (see [44, 53] ). We omit the proof of the following theorem which closely resembles that of Theorem 4.1 in [44] .
is given by (see [44] )
By a verification theorem approach, Peng [44] showed that if the unique solution (φ, ψ)(t, x) of the SHJB equation (4.8) satisfies: 
The Major and Minor Agent Stochastic Mean Field Game System.
In the formulation (2.1)-(2.4) all minor agents are reacting to the same major agent and hence the major agent has non-negligible influence on the mean field behaviour of the minor agents. In other words, the noise process of the major agent w 0 causes random fluctuation of the mean-field behaviour of the minor agents and makes it stochastic (see the discussion in Section 2 of [16] for the major and minor agent MFG LQG model).
In this section, we first construct two auxiliary stochastic optimal control problems (SOCP) with random coefficients for the major and a generic minor agent in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. Then, we present the stochastic mean field system for the major and minor agents game formulation (2.1)-(2.4) via the mean field game consistency condition in Section 5.3.
Stochastic Optimal Control Problem of the Major Agent. By the
McKean-Vlasov convergence result in Theorem 3.1 which indicates that a single minor agent's statistical properties can effectively approximate the empirical distribution produced by all minor agents, we may approximate the empirical distribution of minor agents δ N (·) with a stochastic probability measure µ (·) which depends on the noise process of the major agent w 0 .
In this section, let µ t (ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be an exogenous nominal minor agent stochastic measure process such that µ 0 (dx) := dF (x) where F is defined in (A6.2). Note that in Section 5.3 µ t (ω) will be characterized via the mean field game consistency condition as the random measure of minor agents' mean field behaviour.
We define the following SOCP (4.1)-(4.2) with F w0 t -adapted random coefficients from the major agent's model (2.1) and (2.3) in the infinite population limit:
where we explicitly indicate the dependence of the random measure µ (·) on the sample point ω ∈ Ω.
Step I (Major Agent's Stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) Equation):
The value function of the major agent's SOCP (5.1)-(5.2) is defined by
where x(t) is the initial condition for the process z 0 (s) (see (4.3)). As in Section 4, φ 0 t, x(t) has the form (see (4.7))
and D x ψ 0 (x, t) are a.s. continuous in (x, t), then the pair φ 0 (s, x), ψ 0 (s, x) satisfies the following stochastic HamiltonJacobi-Bellman (SHJB) equation:
and the stochastic Hamiltonian
The solution to the backward in time SHJB equation (5.4) is a forward in time F w0 tadapted pair φ 0 (t, x), ψ 0 (t, x) ≡ φ 0 (t, ω, x), ψ 0 (t, ω, x) (see [44] ).
We note that the appearance of the term σ 0 [t, x, µ t (ω)], D x ψ 0 (t, ω, x) in equation (5.4) corresponds to the major agent's Brownian motion w 0 (·) in the extended Itô-Kunita formula (B.1) for the composition of F w0 t -adapted processes φ 0 (t, ω, x) and z 0 (t, ω) in (5.1).
The best response process of the major agent's SOCP (5.1)-(5.2) is given by
where the infimum exists a.s. here and in all analogous infimizations in the chapter due to the continuity of all functions appearing in H 
Stochastic Optimal Control Problem of the Generic Minor Agent.
As in Section 5.1 let µ t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be the exogenous nominal minor agent stochastic measure process approximating the empirical distribution produced by all minor agents in the infinite population limit such that µ 0 (dx) = dF (x) where F is defined in (A6.2). We let z o 0 (·) be the solution to the major agent's SMV equation (5.6). We define the following SOCP (4.1)-(4.2) with F w0 t -adapted random coefficients from the i th generic minor agent's model (2.2), (2.4) in the infinite population limit:
where we explicitly indicate the dependence of the solution to the major agent's SMV equation z o 0 (·) and the nominal minor agent's random measure µ (·) on the sample point ω ∈ Ω.
Step I (Generic Minor Agent's Stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) Equation):
The value function of the generic minor agent's SOCP (5.7)-(5.8) is defined by
where x(t) is the initial condition for the process z i (·). As in Section 4, φ i t, x(t) has the form (see (4.7)) 
The solution to the backward in time SHJB equation (5.10) is a forward in time F w0 tadapted pair φ i (t, x), ψ i (t, x) ≡ φ i (t, ω, x), ψ i (t, ω, x) (see [44] ). We note that since the coefficients of the SOCP (5.7)-(5.8) are F w0 t -adapted random processes we have the major agent's Brownian motion w 0 in (5.10) which allows us to seek for a forward in time adapted solution to the backward in time SHJB equation (5.10) .
It is important to note that in (5.10) unlike the major agent's SHJB equation (5.4) we do not have the term σ[t, x, z o 0 (t, ω), µ t (ω)]D x ψ i (t, ω, x) since the coefficients in the minor agent's model (5.7)-(5.8) are F w0 t -adapted random processes depending upon the major agent's Brownian motion (w 0 ) which is independent of the minor agent's Brownian motion (w i ) (see the extended Itô-Kunita formula (B.1)).
As in Section 5.1, the stochastic best response process of the minor agent's SOCP (5.7)-(5.8) is
where the infimum exists a.s. here and in all analogous infimizations in the chapter due to the continuity of all functions appearing in H u and the compactness of U . It should be noted that the stochastic best response process of the generic minor agent u o i is a forward in time F 
where f and σ are random processes via z o 0 , µ, and the best response control process u o i which all depend on the Brownian motion of the major agent (w 0 ).
Based on the McKean-Vlasov approximation in Section 3, the generic agent's statistical properties can effectively approximate the empirical distribution produced by all minor agents in a large population system. Hence, we obtain a new stochastic measureμ t (ω) for the mean field behaviour of minor agents as the conditional law of the generic minor agent's process z
An equivalent method to characterize the SMV of the generic minor agent is to express (5.12) in the form of stochastic Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (SFPK) equation with random coefficients: dp(t, ω,
is the conditional probability density of z o i (t, ω) given F w0 t . By the the McKean-Vlasov approximation (see Section 3) it is possible to characterize the mean field behaviour of minor agents in terms of generic agent's density functionp(t, ω, x). The reason that the generic minor agent's FPK equation (5.13) does not include the Itô integral term with respect to w i is due to the fact that p(t, ω, x) is the conditional probability density given F w0 t , and the independence of the Brownian motions w 0 and w i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
The density functionp(t, ω, x) generates the random measure of the minor agent's mean field behaviourμ t (ω) such thatμ(t, ω, dx) =p(t, ω, x)dx (a.s.), 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
We note that the major agent's SOCP (5.1)-(5.2) and minor agent's SOCP (5.7)-(5.8) may be written with respect to the random density p(t, ω, x) of the stochastic measure µ(t, ω, dx) by µ(t, ω, dx) = p(t, ω, x)dx (a.s.), 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
The Mean
Field Game Consistency Condition. Based on the mean field game (MFG) or Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) consistency (see [20] and [28] ), we close the "measure and control" mapping loop by settingμ t (ω) = µ t (ω) a.s.,
The MFG consistency is demonstrated in: (i) the major agent's stochastic mean field game (SMFG) system
where (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , and z o (0) has the measure µ 0 (dx) = dF (x) where F is defined in (A6.2). We note that in the minor agents' SMFG system (5.17)-(5.19) we dropped index i from the generic minor agent's equations (5.7)-(5.12). The Major and Minor (MM) agent SMFG system is given by (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)- (5.19) .
The solution of the MM-SMFG system consists of 8-tuple F w0 t -adapted random processes
where
Note that the MM-SMFG equations (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19) are coupled together through z o 0 (·) and µ (·) . We observe that the solution to the MM-SMFG system is a "stochastic mean field" in contrast to the deterministic mean field of the standard MFG problems with only minor agents considered in [20, 18, 26, 27, 28] . If the noise process of the major agent vanishes then the MM-SMFG system reduces to a deterministic MFG system (see (6) - (9) in [18] ).
For the analysis of next section we denote µ 0 t (ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , as the unit mass random measure concentrated at z o 0 (t, ω) (i.e., µ 0 t (ω) = δ z o 0 (t,ω) ).
6. Existence and Uniqueness of Solutions to the Major and Minor Stochastic Mean Field Game System. In this section we establish existence and uniqueness for the solution of the joint major and minor (MM) agents' SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19). The analysis is based on providing sufficient conditions for a map that goes from the random measure of minor agents µ (·) (ω) back to itself, through the equations (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19), to be a contraction operator on the space of random probability measures (see the diagram below).
In this section we first introduce some preliminary material about the Wasserstein space of probability measures. Second, we analyze the SHJB and SMV equations of the major agent and minor agents in Sections 6.1 and 6.2, respectively. Third, the analysis of the joint major and minor agents' SMFG system is carried out in Section 6.3 where the main result is given in Theorem 6.12 which provides sufficient conditions for a contraction operator map that goes from the random measure of minor agents µ (·) (ω) back to itself.
On the Banach space C([0, T ]; R n ) we define the metric ρ T (x, y) = sup 0≤t≤T |x(t)− y(t)| 2 ∧ 1, where ∧ denotes minimum. It can be shown that C ρ := C([0, T ]; R n ), ρ T forms a separable complete metric space (i.e., a Polish space). Let M(C ρ ) be the space of all Borel probability measures µ on C([0, T ]; R n ) such that |x| 2 dµ(x) < ∞. We also denote M(C ρ ×C ρ ) as the space of probability measures on the product space
As in [20] the process x is defined to be a generic random process with the sample space C([0, T ]; R n ), i.e., x(t, ω) = ω(t) for ω ∈ C([0, T ]; R n ). Based on the metric ρ T , we introduce the Wasserstein metric on M(C ρ ):
is the set of Borel probability measures γ such that
, ρ T is a Polish space. We also introduce the class M β ρ of stochastic measures in the space M ρ with a.s. Hölder continuity of exponent β, 0 < β < 1 (see Definition 3 in [20] for the non-stochastic case). Definition 6.1. A stochastic probability measure µ t (ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , in the space M ρ is in M β ρ if µ is a.s. uniformly Hölder continuous with exponent 0 < β < 1, i.e., there exists β ∈ (0, 1) and constant c such that for any bounded and Lipschitz continuos function φ on R n ,
for all 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T , where c may depend upon the Lipschitz constant of φ and the sample point ω ∈ Ω. As in [20] , we may take µ t , 0 ≤ t ≤ T , to be a Dirac measure at any constant x ∈ R n to show that the set M β ρ is nonempty. We introduce the following assumption.
(A8) For any p ∈ R n and µ, µ [20] ).
Analysis of the
where F is defined in (A2). Then, the functionals of µ (·) (ω) in (5.1)-(5.2) become random functions which we write as
We have the following result which broadly follows Proposition 4 in [20] . Proposition 6.2. Assume (A3) holds for U 0 . Let µ t (ω), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be a fixed stochastic measure in the set M 
By (A4), f 0 [t, ω, z, u] is continuous with respect to (t, z, u) and therefore
is in the set M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, and by (A4) there exists a constant k > 0 independent of (s, z, u) such that
Using the Leibniz rule we have
where the partial derivative exists due to the boundedness of the first order derivative (ii) This is a direct result of (A5).
(iii) The proofs are similar to the proofs for f * 0 in part (i). (iv) This is a direct result of (A8) for S 0 using the measure µ (·) (ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1.
Employing the results of Section 4, we analyze the SHJB equation (5.14) where the probability measure µ (·) (ω) is in the set M β ρ , 0 < β < 1. Theorem 6.3. Assume (A3)-(A7) for U 0 , f 0 , σ 0 and L 0 hold, and the probability measure µ (·) (ω) is in the set M β ρ , 0 < β < 1. Then the SHJB equation for the major agent (5.14) has a unique solution Let µ (·) (ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, be given. We assume that the unique solution (φ 0 , ψ 0 )(t, x) to the SHJB equation (5.14) satisfies the regularity properties:
-adapted stochastic processes. Then, φ 0 (x, t) coincides with the value function (5.3) [44] , and under (A8) for H u0 0 we get the best response control process (5.5):
where (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n . We introduce the following assumption (see (H6) in [20] ).
(A9) For any µ (·) (ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, the best response control u o 0 (t, ω, x) is a.s. continuous in (t, x) and a.s. Lipschitz continuous in x.
We denote C Lip(x) ([0, T ] × Ω × R n ; H) be the class of a.s. continuous functions from [0, T ] × Ω × R n to H, which are a.s. Lipschitz continuous in x [20] . We introduce the following well-defined map:
We now analyze the major agent's SMV equation ( 
On the other hand, Theorem 6.4 indicates that there exists a unique solution to the SMV equation (5.16) such that
Boundedness of f 0 and σ 0 (see (A4)), the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the property of Itô integral yield
where C 1 and C 2 are upper bounds for f 0 and σ 0 , respectively. Hence,
By Kolmogorov's Theorem (Theorem 18.19, Page 266, [24] ), for each 0 < γ < 1/2, T > 0, and almost every ω ∈ Ω, there exists a constant c(ω, γ, K, T ) such that
for all 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T . Hence, µ 0 (·) (ω) is in the class M γ ρ where 0 < γ < 1/2. By Theorems 6.4 and 6.5 we may now introduce the following well-defined map:
6.2. Analysis of the Minor Agents' SMFG System. Let µ (·) (ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, be the fixed stochastic measure assumed in Section 6.1. In this section we assume that µ For the probability measure µ (·) (ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, and µ 0 (·) (ω) ∈ M γ ρ , 0 < γ < 1/2, we assume that the unique solution (φ i , ψ i )(t, x) to the SHJB equation (5.10) satisfies the regularity properties: (i) for each t,
-adapted stochastic processes. Then, φ i (x, t) coincides with the value function (5.9) [44] , and under (A8) for H u we get the best response control process (5.11):
where (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n . We introduce the following assumption (see (A9) or (H6) in [20] ). (A10) For any µ (·) (ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, and µ 0 (·) (ω) ∈ M γ ρ , 0 < γ < 1/2, the best response control process u o i (t, ω, x) is a.s. continuous in (t, x) and a.s. Lipschitz continuous in x.
We introduce the following well-defined map for the generic minor agent i:
For given probability measure µ 
is given in (6.6). We call the pair z 
We define Λ as the map which associates to µ (·) (ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1/2, the law of the process z o i (·, ω, ω ′ ) in (6.8):
where we observe that the law Λ depends on the sample point ω ∈ Ω. We now show that there exists a unique µ (·) (ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, such that µ(ω) = Λ µ(ω) . The proof of the following theorem, which is given in Appendix D in [37] , is based upon a fixed point argument with random parameters (see Theorem 6 in [20] and Theorem 1.1 in [46] for the standard fixed point argument). Then, the probability measure µ (·) (ω) is in the class M β ρ where 0 < β < 1. Proof: We take 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T . For any bounded and Lipschitz continuos function φ on R n with a Lipschitz constant K > 0, we have
On the other hand, Theorem 6.7 indicates that there exists a unique solution to the SMV equation (6.8) such that
where we note that
where C 1 is the upper bound for f . By Kolmogorov's Theorem (Theorem 18.19, [24] , Page 266), for each 0 < γ < 1, T > 0, and almost every ω ∈ Ω, there exists a constant c(ω, γ, K, T ) such that
for all 0 ≤ s < t ≤ T . Hence, µ (·) (ω) is in the class M β ρ where 0 < β < 1. By Theorems 6.7 and 6.8 we may now introduce the following well-defined map:
6.3. Analysis of the Joint Major and Minor Agents' SMFG System. Based on the analysis of Sections 6.1 and 6.2 we obtain the following well-defined map:
which is the composition of the maps Υ 0 , Υ We introduce the following assumption without which one needs to work with the "expectation" of the Wasserstein metric D 
The proof of the following lemma is given in Appendix E in [37] . Lemma 6.9. (i) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U 0 , f 0 and σ 0 , and (A11) hold. Let µ (·) (ω) be in the set M β ρ where 0 < β < 1. Then, for given u 0 , u 
where µ(ω), ν(ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, are induced by the map Υ SMV i in (6.10) using the stochastic measures µ 0 (ω) and ν 0 (ω), respectively. We define the Gâteaux derivative of the function F (t, x, µ) with respect to the measure µ(y) as [23] The proof of the following lemma is based on the sensitivity analysis of the SHJB equations (5.14) and (5.17) to the stochastic measures µ (·) (ω) and µ 0 (·) (ω) developed in Appendix F in [37] (see also Section 6 in [23] ).
Lemma 6.10. (i) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U 0 , f 0 , σ 0 , L 0 , and (A12)-(i) hold. Let (φ 0 (t, x), ψ 0 (t, x)) be the unique solution pair to (5.14) which is C ∞ (R n ) and is a.s. uniformly bounded. In addition, we assume (A8) holds for S 0 and the resulting u 0 is also a.s. Lipschitz continuous in µ. Then, for µ (·) (ω) and ν (·) (ω) in the set M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, there exists a constant c 4 such that
in (6.3) using two stochastic measures µ (·) (ω) and ν (·) (ω), respectively.
(ii) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U , f , σ, L, and (A12)-(ii) hold. Let (φ(t, x), ψ(t, x)) be the unique solution pair to (5.17) which is C ∞ (R n ) and is a.s. uniformly bounded. In addition, we assume (A8) holds for S and the resulting u is also a.s. Lipschitz continuous in µ. Then, for µ 0 (·) (ω) ∈ M γ ρ , 0 < γ < 1/2, and µ (·) (ω) and ν (·) (ω) in the set M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, there exists a constant c 5 such that
in (6.7) using two stochastic measures µ (·) (ω) and ν (·) (ω), respectively.
(iii) Assume (A3)-(A7) for U , f , σ, L, and (A12)-(ii) hold. Let (φ(t, x), ψ(t, x)) be the unique solution pair to (5.17) which is C ∞ (R n ) and is a.s. uniformly bounded. In addition, we assume (A8) holds for S and the resulting u is also a.s. Lipschitz continuous in µ 0 . Then, for µ (·) (ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, and µ 0 (·) (ω) and ν 0 (·) (ω) in the set M γ ρ , 0 < γ < 1/2, there exists a constant c 6 such that
in (6.7) using the two stochastic measures µ 0 (·) (ω) and ν 0 (·) (ω), respectively. Proof: (i) Assumption (A8) for S 0 together with the fact that the resulting u 0 in (A8) is also a.s. Lipschitz continuous in µ yields
We consider the Gâteaux derivative of φ 0 with respect to the measure µ. The assumptions of the theorem imply that the conditions for Proposition F.1 in [37] hold. Therefore, Proposition F.1 in [37] concludes that the Gâteaux derivative of D x φ 0 with respect to measure µ is a.s. uniformly bounded. This together with the mean value theorem yields
with positive constant k 3 . (6.19) and (6.20) give
with k := k 1 + k 2 k 3 , which yields the result.
Remark 6.11. In the standard mean field game model of [20] a similar condition to (6.16)-(6.18) is taken as an assumption (see the feedback regularity condition (37) in [20] ). Following the argument in Section 7.1 of [20] , one can show that the inequalities (6.16)-(6.18) hold in the linear-quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) model with Lipschitz continuous nonlinear couplings.
We recall the map Υ given in (6.11) which is the composition of the maps Υ 0 , Υ SHJB i and Υ SMV i introduced in (6.5), (6.7) and (6.10), respectively (see the diagram below). Proof: The result follows from the Banach fixed point theorem for the map Υ given in (6.11) on the Polish space M β ρ , 0 < β < 1. We note that the gain condition ensures that Υ is a contraction.
As in the classical FBSDEs, the gain condition in Theorem 6.12 is expected to hold for short time-horizon T . Another approach to the solution existence of the MM-SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19) is Schauder's fixed point argument which is the topic of future work.
7. ǫ-Nash Equilibrium Property of the SMFG Control Laws. We let
be the unique solution of the MM-SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)-(5.19) such that SMFG best response u o 0 (t, ω, x) and u o (t, ω, x) are a.s. continuous in (t, x) and a.s. Lipschitz continuous in x.
We now apply the SMFG best responses u o 0 (t, ω, x) and u o (t, ω, x) into a finite N + 1 major and minor population (2.1)-(2.2). This yields the following closed loop individual dynamics:
We set the admissible control set of agent A j , 0 ≤ j ≤ N , as
We note that U j , 0 ≤ j ≤ N , are the full information admissible control which are not restricted to be decentralized. 
We now show that the SMFG best responses for a finite N + 1 major and minor population system (7.1)-(7.2) is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium with respect to the cost functions (2.3)-(2.4) in the case that minor agents are coupled to the major agent only through their cost functions (see the MM-MFG LQG model in [35] ).
(A13) Assume the functions f and σ in (2.2) (and hence in (7.2)) do not contain the state of major agent z N 0 . Note that in the case of assumption (A13) the major agent A 0 has non-negligible influence on the minor agents through their cost functions (2.4). An analysis based on the anticipative variational calculations used in the MM-MFG LQG case [36] is required for establishing the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property of the SMFG best responses in the general case. This extension is currently under investigation and will be reported in future work.
Theorem 7.2. Assume (A1)-(A6) and (A13) hold, and there exists a unique solution to the MM-SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16) and (5.17)- (5.19) 
Proof: Under (A13) we have the the following closed loop individual dynamics under the SMFG best response control processes:
We also introduce the associated Mckean-Vlasov (MV) system
where the right hand side may depend upon the terminal time T .
Let z(0) = R n xdF (x) be the mean value of the minor agents' initial states (see (A2)). We denote
It is evident from (A2) that lim N →∞ ǫ N = 0. To prove the ǫ-Nash equilibrium property we consider two cases as follows.
Case I (strategy change for the major agent A 0 ): While the minor agents are using the SMFG best response control law u 0 (t, ω, x), a strategy change from u 0 0 (t, ω, x) to the F w0 t -adapted process u 0 t, ω, x, z o,N −0 (t, ω) ∈ U 0 for the major agent yields 
is given by the MV system above. Theorem 3.1 and the Gronwall's lemma imply that
We also introduce
with initial conditionẑ 0 (0) = z 0 (0), where µ (·) is the minor agents' measure given by the MV system above. Again, by Theorem 3.1 and the Gronwall's lemma It can be shown that
(A3), (A6), (7.4)-(7.6) and Theorem 3.1 yield
where the appearance of the ǫ N term in the first inequality of (7.7) is due to the fact that here the sequence of minor agents' initials {z o j (0) : 1 ≤ j ≤ N } in the SMV system (7.3) is generated by independent randomized observations on the distribution F given in (A2).
Furthermore, by the construction of the major agent's SMFG system (5.14)-(5.16) (see the major agent's SOCP (5.1)-(5.2)) we have
But, Theorem 3.1 and (7.4) imply
It follows from (7.7)-(7.9) that
. Case II (strategy change for the minor agents): Without loss of generality, we assume that the first minor agent changes its MF best response control strategy u o (t, ω, x) to u 1 t, ω, x, z −1 (t, ω) ∈ U 1 . This leads to
By the same argument as in proving Theorem 3.1 (see Appendix B in [37] ) it can be shown that
is given by the MV system above. Theorem 3.1 and the Gronwall's lemma implies that
with initial conditionẑ 1 (0) = z 1 (0), where µ (·) is the minor agents' measure given by the MV system above. Again, by Theorem 3.1 and the Gronwall's lemma It can be shown that
Using (7.4) and (7.10)-(7.11), and by the same argument as in (7.7)-(7.9) we can show that J
Conclusion. This paper studies a stochastic mean field game (SMFG) system for a class of dynamic games involving nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems with major and minor (MM) agents. The SMFG system consists of coupled (i) backward in time stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (SHJB) equations, and (ii) forward in time stochastic McKean-Vlasov (SMV) or stochastic Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (SFPK) equations. Existence and uniqueness of the solution to the MM-SMFG system is established by a fixed point argument in the Wasserstein space of random probability measures. In the case that minor agents are coupled to the major agent only through their cost functions, the ǫ N -Nash equilibrium property of the SMFG best responses is shown for a finite N population system where ǫ N = O(1/ √ N ). As a particular but important case, the results of Nguyen and Huang [35] for MM-SMFG linearquadratic-Gaussian (LQG) systems with homogeneous population are retrieved, and, in addition, the results of this paper are illustrated with a major and minor agent version of a game model of the synchronization of coupled nonlinear oscillators (see Appendices G and H in [37] 
which implies the result of the theorem by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. First by the inequality (x + y) 2 ≤ 2x 2 + 2y 2 , we have
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the properties of Itô integrals we then obtain
Applying the inequality (x+y +z) 2 ≤ 3(x 2 +y 2 +z 2 ), and the Lipschitz continuity conditions of f 0 and ϕ 0 to (A.2) we obtain
where C > 0 is a constant independent of N . Due to the centring of
with respect to x and the independence of z j andz j ′ when j = j ′ , there are no cross terms in the expansion of the last term in [46] , Page 175). This property together with (A.3), the boundedness of f 0 and the inequality (
where k 1 (t) ≥ 0 is an increasing function independent of N . Similarly, for the second term on the right hand side of (A.1) we have
The inequalities (A.1), (A.4) and (A.5) imply that
Second, by taking a similar approach for the i th minor agent (1 ≤ i ≤ N ) we get
where k(T ) > 0 is independent of N . The inequalities (A.6) and (A.7) yield
It follows from Gronwall's Lemma that
where the right hand side may only depend upon the terminal time T . This yields
The inequalities (A.7) and (A.9) combined with Gronwall's Lemma imply that
This completes the proof.
Appendix B: Extended Itô-Kunita Formula. We recall an extended version of the Itô-Kunita formula [25] for the composition of stochastic processes (see Theorem 2.3 in [44] ).
Theorem B.1. Let φ(t, x) be a stochastic process a.s. continuous in (t, x) such that (i) for each t, φ(t, ·) is a C 2 (R n ) map a.s., (ii) for each x, φ(·, x) is a continuous semi-martingale represented by
where Γ(t, x) and ψ k (t, x), 1 ≤ k ≤ m, are F W t -adapted stochastic processes which are continuous in (t, x) a.s., such that for each t, Γ(t, ·) is a C 1 (R n ) map a.s., and
t -adapted stochastic processes such that (i) f i is an integrable process a.s., and (ii) σ i and ς i are square integrable processes (a.s.).
Then the composition map φ(·, x(·)) is also a continuous semi-martingale which has the form
Appendix D: Proof of Theorems 6.7. Let ω ∈ Ω be fixed. For given probability measure µ (·) (ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, we can show that the law of the process z
We take
be defined by (6.9), and similarly x o i (·, ω, ω ′ ) be defined by (6.9) after replacing µ (·) (ω) by ν (·) (ω). We have
But,
where C is obtained from the boundedness and Lipschitz continuity of both f and u o , and γ ∈ M(C ρ × C ρ ) is any coupling of µ and ν where
Taking the infimum over all such γ couplings and then using the definition of metrics ρ (·) and D
Similarly we have
where C 1 is obtained from the boundedness and Lipschitz continuity of both σ.
which by Gronwall's lemma yields
This together with the definition of the Wasserstein metric D ρ (·) leads to the contraction inequality:
By following a similar argument as in [46] (Theorem 1.1) , we can show that {Λ k (µ(ω)) : k ≥ 1} forms a Cauchy sequence a.s. in the complete metric space M β ρ , 0 < β < 1, and converges a.s. to a unique (a.s.) fixed point of Λ.
Appendix E: Proof of Lemma 6.9. (i) (5.16) gives
corresponding to the control processes u 0 and u
. By the Lipschitz continuity of f 0 (see (A4) and (A5)) there are positive constants C 0 and C 1 such that
The Gronwall's lemma yields
This together with the fact that µ (ii) We have
corresponding to the stochastic measures µ(ω), ν(ω) ∈ M β ρ , 0 < β < 1. By the Lipschitz continuity of f 0 (see (A4) and (A5)) and u o 0 there are positive constants C 0 and C 1 such that
[16]. In this case all functions in (2.1)-(2.4) are given by (see Remark 2.1) So we retrieve the MM-SMFG system for LQG dynamic games model of [35] for minor agents with uniform parameters (see equations (10)- (11) and (22)- (23) in [35] , see also [16] ). The reader is referred to [35] for an explicit representation of a solution to the SMFG LQG system under some appropriate conditions. We note that key assumption for solution existence and uniqueness of MM-SMFG system is that all drift and cost functions and their derivatives are bounded (see Section 2.1) which clearly does not hold for the MM-SMFG LQG problem (as in classical LQG control). In this case, a generalized Four-Step Scheme (see Section 5.2 in Chapter 7 of [53] ) seems to give not only weaker general conditions but also presents explicit solutions to the MM-SMFG LQG case. This is currently under investigation and will be reported in future work.
Appendix H: A Nonlinear Example. In this section we present a major and minor version of the synchronization of coupled nonlinear oscillators game model [50] . Consider a population of N + 1 oscillators with dynamics dθ N j (t) = u N j (t)dt + σdw j (t) (mod 2π) 0 ≤ j ≤ N, t ≥ 0, (H.1) where θ j (t) ∈ [0, 2π] is the phase of the j th oscillator at time t, u j (·) is the control input, σ is a non-negative scalar, and {w j : 0 ≤ j ≤ N } denotes a sequence of independent standard scalar Wiener processes (see [50] ). It is assumed that the initial states In a similar way, the minor agents' SMFG system (5.13) and (5.17)-(5.18) is given by − dφ(t, ω, x) = − 1 4r ∂ x φ(t, ω, x)) 2 + m(t, ω, x) + σ 2 2 ∂ 2 xx φ(t, ω, x) dt − ψ(t, ω, x)dw(t, ω), φ(T, x) = 0, u o (t, ω, x) = − 1 2r ∂ x φ(t, ω, x), dp(t, ω, x) = 1 2r ∂ x ∂ x φ(t, ω, x) p(t, ω, x) + σ where m(t, ω, x) is called the infinite population cost-coupling of the major agent. The reader is referred to the deterministic mean field system (14a)-(14c) in [50] for the synchronization of coupled nonlinear oscillators game model with only minor agents.
